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Isaiah Berlin and Elie Kedourie: Recollections of Two Giants
By Martin Sieff
Sir
Isaiah Berlin, one of the most eminent historians of political
philosophy of the past century, passed away in 1997. Elie Kedourie,
one of the leading experts on the 20th century political history
of the Fertile Crescent, died five years earlier. Both men were
among the most profound thinkers and analysts on the nature and
problems of modern political nationalism. From 1969 through 1976,
I was privileged to study and work under both of them in various
capacities. It proved to be a life-defining experience.
Isaiah
Berlin is now primarily remembered as the champion of pluralism
and toleration
in political thought. He was a pioneering historian
of the European radical right wing reaction against French enlightenment
values in the 18th and 19th centuries. He is perhaps most famous
for his warning that any attempt to create a utopia, however
well-meaning and regardless of the ideology involved, can only
result in the
inevitable creation of a hell on earth instead. For, just as
human beings are infinitely variable in their backgrounds, interests
and passions among each other, each individual is also the sum
of many conflicting desires, experiences and cultural layers,
some of which will inevitably be in conflict with each other.
Therefore
to Berlin, some level of conflict, and even of tragic choice
is inevitable, not just between individuals, but within them.
Berlin,
however, did not despair of the human condition, as his famous
appreciations of Winston Churchill and Franklin
Roosevelt
showed. He was a classic liberal in the sense that he believed
it possible, desirable and necessary to ameliorate the human condition
and to push for peace in the world, the extension of political
freedoms and the avoidance, where possible, of un-necessary conflicts.
It is no coincidence that Timothy Garton Ash, who was so courageously
and personally involved in human rights activities in Central Europe
in the decade before the collapse of communism, proudly described
himself as a continuing disciple of Berlin, adopting John F. Kennedy's
legendary declaration, "Ich bin ein Berliner."
Where Berlin was essentially optimistic about the human condition,
Kedourie was intensely pessimistic about it. He believed that empire
was the most stable, successful and therefore morally desirable
form of government known to humankind. He made no secret in his
writings of his admiration for the Ottoman Empire that, he contended,
had solved the problems of governance throughout the Middle East
far more effectively than any of its predecessors or successors
ever managed to.
This fear and loathing of the excesses of the mob,
and his Hobbes-ian understanding of the need for firm and stable
government as the
essential prerequisite to every other human attainment, could result
occasional in strange remarks or insights. Once, in 1986 as I recall,
Kedourie was speaking at the Washington Hilton Hotel as a guest
of the Washington Institute for Near East Studies. It was the early
days of what proved to be a very happy series of associations for
him with the institute and with Washington in general. One questioner
made a comment about Syrian President Hafez Assad's ruthless
and, indeed, horrific record of torture and repression, including
the crushing of the Islamist popular revolt in the city of Hama
in 1982. Kedourie had been a fearless trailblazer among Western
scholars documenting the atrocities carried out by the Ba'ath
regimes in Syria and Iraq. But on this occasion, he only nodded
approvingly and said, "Yes. That fellow knows how to handle
them." In Kedourie's eyes, even Assad was preferable to anarchy.
He wholeheartedly agreed with the Roman historian Tacitus--better
Tiberius than a committee.
Berlin
and Kedourie were vastly different figures in their reputation,
personality, public persona and even in the nature of their work.
They were indeed a study in contrasts. Berlin became a nationally
known figure while still in his early 20's when he became the first
Jew to be accepted as a fellow of All Souls College, Oxford. He
was at the heart of the British Establishment all his life. His
weekly dispatches on domestic U.S. politics as a British diplomat
in the United States through most of World War II were much prized
by War Premier Winston Churchill. Fast talking, charming, brilliant,
warm and gregarious, he counted President Franklin Roosevelt and
many eminent Americans among his personal friends. In the early
1950's, his series of radio lectures on liberty, broadcast nationally
by the British Broadcasting Corporation, made him a national celebrity
in Britain. In addition to his academic work, he was a major figure
in British academic institutions for much of his long life. He
was the architect of Wolfson College, Oxford. It was through his
Wolfson College eminence that I was introduced to him by his close
friend, my tutor the late Dr. Hans Schenk, an expert on modern
European history, culture and political thought, who had served
as dean of Wolfson.
Kedourie by contrast lived life in a minor key. Where Berlin was
embraced by the British academic establishment while still in his
teens, Kedourie bucked it early. He never received his PhD because
he refused pressure to amend it from hostile examiners at St. Anthony's
College, Oxford. The work was later published and proved a seminal
study in the history of Britain's imperial involvement with
the Middle East in the first half of the 20th century. And although
Kedourie rose to comparable heights of academic prestige and influence
to Berlin, he never lost that sense of confronting what he regarded
as the inanities of Conventional Wisdom head on.
Their politics were a study in contrasts too. Berlin,
a tolerant social democrat and liberal, proudly and consistently
referred
to himself all his life as a Man of the Left. This should have
been anathema to Kedourie, a skeptical minimal government conservative
who skewered the efforts of post-war British Labour governments
to micromanage society and bureaucratically plan for prosperity,
most notably in his classic essay "The Crossman Papers."
Yet beneath the surface, the two men had far more in common than
met the eye, and this, I believe accounted for the real and lasting
bond of respect and trust between them, as well as for their hidden
strength.
Isaiah
Berlin was a Latvian Jew whose family escaped the Bolshevik revolution.
As a young boy, his most searing memory was of seeing
a policeman murdered by a mob. Kedourie grew up in a wealthy Iraqi
Jewish family in Baghdad. As a 15-year-old schoolboy he witnessed
the notorious farhud, or pogrom against the Jewish community
of Baghdad in 1941. Hundreds of defenseless Iraqi Jews were killed
and countless women raped. The farhud came after the British
Army had foiled a military coup by the Iraqi Army to switch Iraq
over
to the side of the Nazis in World War II. In frustration, the Iraqi
Army vented its fury on the Jews of Baghdad. But as Kedourie later
documented in a celebrated article, the British forces were held
back for days to score political points with the Iraqi population.
Both
men came from eminent, even fabled Jewish families of ancient
lineage. Kedourie was a devoutly religious Orthodox Jew who was
shomer shabbat. Berlin was related to the Lubavitcher
Rebbe, an association he was wary of. He was passionately secular
all his
life. He did not feel comfortable with intense religious devotion.
However, he was a proud Jew who attended synagogue on Yom Kippur
and was very active in supporting Jewish student activities at
the University of Oxford. The shy, retiring Kedourie by contrast
was seldom seen socially among even his postgraduate students at
the London School of Economics.
Dealing with both of them personally, as I can testify, was a
vastly different experience. Berlin was by nature ebullient,
witty and outgoing. He was a born raconteur. He loved to tell
the story of a party he had attended in the 1930's where Zionist
movement leader Chaim Weizmann, later the first president of
the State of Israel, was asked by an aristocratic British lady
admirer, "Dr. Weizmann, I do not understand. You are a
member of the most cultured, civilized, brilliant and cosmopolitan
people in history and you want to give it all up to become--Albania?" According
to Berlin, Weizmann pondered thoughtfully and slowly on the question,
then his face lit up like an electric light bulb. "Yes!" he
exclaimed. "Albania! Albania!" The story gave Berlin--a cosmopolitan
rather than an Albanian to the core of his soul--endless delight.
He was the soul of generosity and he always judged
people's motives with an excess of charity. On one occasion,
I was involved
in fund-raising to send some Oxford students to a conference in
Philadelphia and much to my chagrin could not go myself because
I had been sucked into another student bridge-building adventure
in, of all places, Yugoslavia. Sir Isaiah was sympathetic to my
plight. "So, Mr. Sieff," he said. "You made it
possible for others to go but you didn't go yourself. That
was very noble, very noble." "No, sir" I replied
with my usual Northern Irish directness and lack of tact. "It
was very stupid." "No! No!" he cried. "It
was noble! It was noble!"
I
was only one of many thousands of young students whose paths
he crossed over the decades, and whose future career was launched
or
greatly enhanced through his care and enthusiasm. I last spoke
with him in 1976 before going to Israel where I worked for several
years on the Jerusalem Post. More than a quarter century later,
and well after Sir Isaiah's death, I was dining with my old
friend, then-chief at UPI, John O'Sullivan--formerly
a senior policy advisor and speechwriter for many years to British
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher--and I mentioned to John what
a fortunate day it had been for me when I started to contribute
for
him when he was editor of the National Review. "My dear
boy," John
laughed, "I knew all about you long before that." "But
how was that?" I exclaimed. "We never met before 1989.
I would have remembered." "Yes," John replied. "But
when I came over to work in the United States a few years before
that, I received a note of congratulation from Sir Isaiah saying
he had heard that one of his disciples, Martin Sieff, had preceded
me over and he recommended you most enthusiastically to me."
By
contrast, early meetings with Kedourie, when I did my postgraduate
work under him at the London School of Economics, could be nerve-wracking.
This was not because Kedourie was harsh or unkind in any way. What
he was, I finally came to realize after many months, was profoundly
shy. He would speak at meetings softly and often elliptically.
He would have made an excellent police interrogator because by
saying as little as possible, he drew his interlocutors out as
much as possible. A short, wintry smile from him was the equivalent
of a warm embrace or a slap on the back from many others.
Where Kedourie and Berlin came together was in their celebration
of British civilization and political values.
Their
attitudes towards Zionism were also a study in contrasts. Kedourie,
as his early writings indicate, long blamed the activities
of the pre-State and early State Zionist movement for setting off
the firestorm of anti-Semitism that destroyed the ancient, wealthy,
and fabled Jewish community of Baghdad, and Jewish communities
throughout Iraq. In later years, his attitude towards the State
of Israel
dramatically mellowed. I suspect this was in significant part due
to the toppling of the long-time Labor Party ascendancy in Israel,
which he loathed, and its replacement by the nationalist Likud
leadership, especially when it was led by Menahem Begin. Begin,
a traditional Jew who often wore his kipa at public functions,
was much more emotionally reassuring to the privately devout and
traditional Kedourie than the Labor leaders with all their talk
of social engineering, secularism and a superficial rationalism
and confidence that they, and they alone, had solved "the Jewish
Question." In his last years, Kedourie contributed regularly
to Commentary magazine, and his engagement with them,
I believe, would have continued to go had his life not been cut
short
by a
heart attack.
Berlin
was a close personal friend of Chaim Weizmann and was extremely
active in the British Zionist movement in the 1930's, when it was
far from the respectable, mainstream establishment cause that it
became in the early decades of the state. Israel's first
Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, thought so highly of Berlin that
he asked him to become his chief of staff and run the prime minister's
office right after the state was formed. When Berlin turned the
job down, it went to Teddy Kollek instead; but after the Likud
takeover in 1977 and the commitment to major settlement on the
West Bank,
his level of comfort with Israel appears to have significantly
declined.
Beneath
Berlin's support of human rights and Kedourie's advocacy for
tough, long-lasting empires, however, lay a shared,
clear-eyed and "realist" recognition about the unavoidably
flawed condition of human nature. Berlin loved to quote the late
in life admission of a despairing Immanuel Kant that, "out
of the crooked timber of humanity, no straight thing can be made." The
term "crooked timber" indeed serves as the title for
one of the collections of his essays edited by Henry Hardy.
Kedourie
believed in empire because he believed, along with Rabbi Hanina
in the Ethics of the Fathers, that but for the reality
of government, men would swallow each other alive. His greatest
criticism
of the British Empire, and one that made him astonishingly anomalous
to the prevailing fashions of British culture and academia from
the 1950's through the 1970's, was that it was not tough enough
to sustain and defend itself. He regarded the retreat from empire--not
the creation of it--as the most shameful period in British history,
involving as it did the abandonment of many millions of
ordinary, decent people of ethnic, religious and political minorities
around the world to the merciless passions of mobs and triumphant
extremist ideologies.
I
saw Kedourie quite often during my early years in Washington.
He found academic and social life in the city
congenial and spent
increasing periods of time there at institutions such as the Washington
Institute for Near East Policy. He was living and working in Washington
when he died. I dined with him and his brilliant wife Sylvia Haim
a few months before he passed away. It was a delightful evening
and none of us, I think, had any intimations of finality. The Washington
media at the time was full of reports about the controversy over
the hapless April Glaspie, the U.S. ambassador to Baghdad who had
somehow failed to realize in a crucial 1990 meeting that Iraqi
President Saddam Hussein was actually asking her for U.S. permission
to invade and conquer Kuwait. Glaspie's bungling fitted into
one of the central themes of Kedourie's great corpus of work--the
crucial role that obscure government bureaucrats, no one in the
general public has ever heard of, can hold in shaping crucial
policies of war and peace that decide the destiny of nations. In
Kedourie's eyes, Glaspie was cut from the same cloth as Sir
Gilbert Clayton, Sir Mark Sykes, Sir Ronald Storrs and other British
bureaucrats who had shaped the future of the Middle East during
World War I, based on their limitless ignorance and even greater
confidence in their own ineptitude. The last words I remember him
saying to me that night were, "Remember Martin, nothing changes.
Nothing ever changes."
The posthumous reputations of both men have also been a study
in contrasts. Berlin's reputation soared thanks to two typically
wise and shrewd personnel decisions he made during his lifetime.
He chose Michael Ignatieff as his biographer and Henry Hardy as
his editor.
Ignatieff's
biography is luminous. For anyone who knew and loved the man,
it is like being privileged to enter his company
again. For anyone who did not, it captures the largeness of heart,
the genius and generosity and the sheer fun of Berlin, as well
as his insecurities.
Hardy has produced a steady stream of collections
of Berlin's writings that have forever buried the two sneering
asides that
were often made about him while he was still alive--that
while a lecturer and raconteur of genius, he never actually produced
an impressively scholarly body of work, and that he was too much
of a "fox" by his own definition--a talented
fellow who never seriously focused sufficiently on one issue or
theme.
However,
when the body of his work was assembled from the many obscure
specialist journals, in which so much of
it had appeared,
it turned out to be an impressive, multi-volume achievement after
all. And far from being a "fox," according to his own
definition of political thinkers, Berlin emerged as a "hedgehog" after
all, a figure who "knew one great thing."
For
in the brief 1990's breathing space between the collapse of communism
and the global challenge of extreme Islamism, it emerged
that there was indeed a single, over-riding theme to much of Berlin's
work--a sustained, highly original and serious engagement
with the nature of political extremism, and, most especially, the
forms it takes in reacting fearfully to the challenges of modernism.
This
in turn has led to a new series of sniping attacks on Berlin
from some conservatives and from the likes of Christopher Hitchens--bizarrely
enough, a long-time Trotskyite--that Berlin lacked moral courage,
never took stands on issues and that his work is irrelevant
in an era when the West needs to renew its moral, intellectual
and political fiber to face the growing assault on its existence
from the Islamists.
In
brief response, I would first note that Berlin was outspoken
in his public opposition to, and criticism of, fascism, Nazism
and communism throughout his life, including on many occasions
when doing so risked his professional and social standing and prospects.
Also, unlike most, if not all, of his critics, his personal courage
was demonstrated on many occasions. In the fall of 1940, he left
political war work in the safe and prosperous United States to
return home to a London under daily bombing attack from the Luftwaffe,
for no greater reason than that he could not bear to think of the
family, friends and country that he loved being under such assault
without him being there to share it. (His letters to family and
friends from New York and Washington through the war years are
suffused with homesickness and a yearning for England.)
As to the current relevance and moral fiber of Berlin's
work, one should start from the recognition that he tackles the
underlying flaws of the political fantasies that killed up to a
quarter of a billion human beings in the combined ideological slaughters
of the 20th century. No living political thinker, nor any other
who has lived and worked over the past century arguably challenges
the underlying philosophical delusions of ideological extremism
and the conviction that humanity can and should be perfected within
a few years so cogently.
Further,
I would argue that Berlin's studies of the 18th century European
reactionaries, their criticisms of the Enlightenment
and of the French Revolution, and his engagement with Kant are
more timely and essential than ever, as we contemplate the ruins
of the American adventure in Iraq, and the gains that extreme Islamism
has made in Egypt, Kuwait, the Palestinian territories and elsewhere,
from the opportunities that ill-timed democratic elections have
offered it. Globalism, free markets and democracy are under attack
around the globe from forces suffused with the hatred and fear
of modernism. Berlin's work on the 18th century reaction against
the Enlightenment gives us crucially needed insight into the roots
and nature of this phenomenon.
Berlin
believed in democracy passionately, and far more so than Kedourie.
But he recognized that democracy was not, contrary to
Francis Fukuyama's famous argument in The End of History,
the inevitable, eternal global victor in the endless battle of
ideas for dominance over the minds of men--and women. Berlin's
much criticized so-called moral relativism is not an admission
of despair or defeat but a cautious recognition that we cannot
take the universal application or triumph of ideas that we hold
admirable for granted, amid the limitless uncertainties and surprises
of unfolding history.
Kedourie
would certainly have agreed with that. If anything, I think Kedourie
was the greater visionary and romantic of the two,
and Berlin the greater conservative. Berlin was cautious in his
political prescriptions. Kedourie would certainly have embraced
a Pax Americana over the Middle East to succeed the short and imperfect
Pax Britannica, whose disintegration he observed at first hand.
But he would, I have no doubt, be appalled--though in
no way surprised--at the mess U.S. policymakers made of
their adventure in nation-building in Iraq, so succinctly summed
up in the title of Thomas Ricks' new book, Fiasco.
Kedourie
was never a household name in Britain as Berlin was, but it did
not, I think, bother him. He never sought it. He was
secure in his professional reputation and his standing among colleagues
he respected. He greatly welcomed the long ascendancy of President
Ronald Reagan and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher over the United
States and Britain through the 1980's as a reassertion of the basic
moral and political values that he believed the West had abandoned
for so long. He never wrote any single big, broad, ambitious sweeping
work. But, like Berlin, he was prolific in producing articles of
the highest quality and scholarly importance that were collected
in a series of books. In his case, they almost all appeared within
his own lifetime. However, since his death, they have been widely
forgotten or ignored in the United States, as in Britain.
This
is more than a pity; it has had extremely serious deleterious
policy consequences for the American people.
Had U.S.
policymakers and opinion-makers, for example, simply read Kedourie's
scathing essay "The Kingdom of Iraq" before invading
the country to topple Saddam Hussein in March 2003, they would
have been left in no doubt that the rapid imposition of a theoretically
democratic system in Iraq would not solve any of that unhappy nation's
longstanding political and social problems, but could only exacerbate
them. For
Iraq was democratic from 1925 to 1958, with Britain playing the "stabilizing" and "guardian" role
that the United States did after 2003, not merely for three or
five
or even 10 years, but for 33 of them, and Kedourie chronicled the
result: "Brief as it is, the record of the kingdom of Iraq
is full of bloodshed, treason and rapine; and however pitiful
its end, we may now say this was implicit in its beginning."
Isaiah
Berlin and Elie Kedourie were both titans. They were men who
combined the greatest scholarly gifts and achievements
in their chosen fields with a truly rare purity and generosity
of soul. Their moral stature was immense in all their personal
dealings as well as their professional standing. I admired and
appreciated both of them in the years I studied and worked under
them. Far from missing them, I feel their presence more constantly
at my side as we enter darker days that would have saddened both
of them, but certainly would not have surprised either of them.
About the Author
Martin Sieff is national security correspondent for United
Press International and former chief foreign correspondent of The
Washington Times. He has been nominated for the Pulitzer Prize
for international reporting three times. His book The Rising
Superpowers: The challenge of India and China to U.S. policymakers
in the 21st
century is due to be published by the Cato Institute next year.

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Covenant - Global Jewish Magazine 2006
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